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1 Introduction
In January 2019 the UK’s Conservative government led by Prime Minister Theresa May
suffered the worst defeat ever recorded in the history of the House of Commons. Its
flagship policy, leaving the European Union (EU) in a way that compromised between
the polarised “Hard Brexit” and “Remain” factions in Parliament, was defeated by 432
to 202 votes, a majority of 230. The principle reason for the defeat was a huge rebellion
by 118 Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs). In March the government held two
further votes, on the same policy, and again lost by large margins: 149 and 58. Two
months later the Prime Minister announced her resignation.
These three so-called Meaningful Votes on May’s Withdrawal Agreement rank among
the great votes of British parliamentary history. They echo the vote on the repeal of the
Corn Laws, which put an end to trade protection of agricultural products and split the
Tory party in 1846 (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006), and also the Great Reform Act, which
reformed the system of parliamentary representation in 1832, with Tory MPs who broke
the party line playing a pivotal role (Aidt and Franck 2013, 2019). It is historically very
rare for a UK government to lose with more than 100 votes on a key piece of legislations.
The last time was in 1924 when the minority Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald
was defeated by margins of 166, 161 and 140.
In this paper, we seek to explain why Conservative MPs rebelled, and understand
what drove their individual decisions not to toe the party line. We argue that the three
Meaningful Votes can potentially provide valuable general insights into why MPs rebel
against their leaders and why the organizational structures and mechanisms that normally
ensure party discipline and unity occasionally break down and result in the government
being “rolled” and losing important votes. The sequence of Meaningful Votes has at least
four appealing features that allow us to do this. First, as already noted, it is rare that
a high stakes government bill is so decisively defeated. Second, it was not a so-called
free vote where the party leaders allow their MPs to vote as they like. On the contrary,
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both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party “whipped”, demanding their MPs
toe the party line. This means that it was not costless for MPs to rebel. Third, as a
consequence of the 2016 Brexit referendum, we, uniquely, observe revealed preferences on
the question of leaving the EU for each MP (we know how they voted and campaigned)
and for their voters in each of the 650 parliamentary constituencies (we know the share
of them who voted Leave and Remain). Fourth, the MPs effectively voted on the same
bill three times, which is also highly unusual. This enables us to developed an innovative
new test of career concerns.
The purpose of the paper is, therefore, two-fold. First, we want to document the
correlates behind the mass rebellion against the Withdrawal Agreement (May’s deal)
inside the Conservative Party. Second, we want to leverage the unique features of the
sequence of Meaningful Votes to test the “tripartite model” of party rebellion (Muller and
Strom 1999). The model, which we outline in Section 4, postulates that an MP’s vote
decision is a function of three potentially conflicting factors: the MP’s own preferences
(his or her ideology), political career concerns, and the preferences of their constituents.
The fact that we observe plausible proxies for the revealed preference of the MPs and
their constituents enables us to contribute to the extensive literature on party discipline
and rebellion (see Kam 2014; Kirkland and Slapin 2018).
Our inquiry into the rebellion amongst Conservative backbench MPs yields the follow-
ing insights. First, we find evidence that MPs were influenced by their own preferences
(ideology), career concerns and constituency preferences, but that their own preference
was almost twice as important as the other two factors. Specifically, MPs who had voted
and campaigned against leaving the EU in the referendum (Remain MPs) were almost 40
percent more likely to support May’s deal than other (Leave) MPs, while MPs represent-
ing constituencies with (one standard deviation) more Leave voters were 17 percent less
likely to support the deal. MPs mindful of their career prospects under a May government
were about 20 percent more likely to support May’s deal. We also present (suggestive)
evidence that the prospect of promotion to government posts in a future government mo-
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tivated the MPs. Somewhat paradoxically, the rebellion within the Conservative Party
that defeated May’s deal in the House of Commons three times in a row came from
MPs who had supported Leave in the referendum and from MPs elected in Leave leaning
constituencies. Second, we find that the effects are heterogeneous across different sub-
samples of MPs in theoretically interesting ways. MPs elected to safe seats placed more
weight on career concerns than MPs elected in marginal seats who placed more weight
on constituency preferences in their rebellion calculus. Leave MPs but not Remain MPs
were motivated by constituency preferences. This is consistent with two types of grand-
standing: Leave MPs could signal “ideological purity” to their Leave voters by voting
against May’s deal; Remain MPs could pander to their Leave voters by “converting” and
voting for May’s deal. MPs with a history of rebellion did not place different weight on
career concerns in their calculus to party loyalists.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a short literature review
that places our study in context. Section 3 sets out the background to the three Mean-
ingful Votes. Section 4 presents the “tripartite” model of partisan rebellion. Section 5
presents the data. Section 6 explains our estimation strategy. Section 7 presents the
results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
Our analysis of the sequence of Meaningful Votes contributes to two main strands of
literature. First, we contribute to the literature on party discipline and roll call rebels
(for overviews, see Kirkland and Slapin (2018) or Kam (2014)). The central question in
this literature is why individual politicians decide to defy the political party to which
they belong and vote against the party’s agreed policy in roll call votes or parliamentary
divisions (as they are known in the UK). Krehbiel (1993) views it as a competition between
politicians’ ideological preferences, their concern about re-election, and their loyalty to
their party. Loyalty may, in turn, be induced by political career concerns (Muller and
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Strom 1999) or through a process of political socialization (Crowe 1986). We build
on this theoretical framework. Empirical work has focussed on the US where roll call
rebellion is widespread and it is common for moderate legislators to “cross the aisle”
(e.g., Kirkland and Slapin 2018). However, in spite of greater party discipline in many
parliamentarian systems, it is not uncommon for individual “backbench” politicians (i.e.,
those with no position in government) to revolt against their party in many other countries
too (e.g., Kam 2009; Morgenstern 2003; Carey 2008; Hix et al. 2007; Kauder et al.
2017). Unlike in US politics, however, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere it tends
to be politicians with ideologically extreme views who rebel (Kam 2009), and mainly
from within the governing party (Kirkland and Slapin 2018). The available evidence
suggest that voters pay some attention to how their representatives vote at least when
the issue is controversial, and that they reward them for rebelling (e.g., Longley 1998;
Johnston et al. 2002; Pattie et al. 1994; Bertelli and Dolan 2009; Vivyan and Wagner
2012; Campbell et al. 2019). The evidence also shows that career concerns play a role
(e.g., Benedetto and Hix 2007; Eggers and Spirling 2018) although the evidence on
whether parties actually punish individual politicians for voting against the party line is
mixed (Eggers and Spirling 2016; Kauder et al. 2017). We contribute to this empirical
literature by studying how ideology, career concerns and voter preferences shaped the
pattern of rebellion within the Conservative Party in the British House of Commons on
an especially high stakes bill. In particular, we are able to leverage the fact that we have
plausible measures of both MP and voter preferences on the issue to evaluate the relative
importance of the three forces that generally influence a politician’s decision to rebel.
Second, our analysis contributes to the small emerging literature on the causes of the
Brexit referendum result itself.1 Becker et al. (2017), Arnorsson and Zoega (2018), Zhang
(2018) and Fidrmuc et al. (2019) use aggregate vote share results at the local authority,
constituency or ward level to study the socio-economic correlates of the Leave vote share.
Becker et al. (2017) find that areas with voting populations with low levels of education,
1See Clarke et al. (2017) for a comprehensive analysis of Brexit referendum and its background.
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low incomes, historical reliance on manufacturing employment, and high unemployment
rates were all associated with a higher Leave vote share. There is also evidence that areas
with a high proportion of British male adults and with a high proportion of elderly voters
predominately voted Leave (Zhang 2018). Arnorsson and Zoega (2018), in addition, find
that areas with high net immigration were more suspicious of immigrants in general
and, in turn, were more likely to vote Leave. Fidrmuc et al. (2019) show that the
Remain vote share is (weakly) positively correlated with the amount of funds that an area
received from the EU’s Cohesion Fund but that getting funds from the EU was (strongly)
negatively correlated with turnout in the referendum. However, there is always a danger
trying to infer individual vote intentions from aggregate vote share data (the ecological
fallacy). To address this, Alabrese et al. (2019) explore the latest wave of the large UK-
based household survey (Understanding Society), which included a question about how
individuals voted in the referendum. They find that voting Leave was associated with
older age, white ethnicity, low educational attainment, infrequent use of smartphones and
the internet, receiving benefits, adverse health, and low life satisfaction. Fetzer (2019)
also uses the Understanding Society data to study the determinants of identification with
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) – a single issue party that since the
1990s has campaigned for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Using within
individual variation in exposure to welfare cuts, the paper shows that individuals were
more likely to “feel close” to UKIP after they were personally affected by the government’s
austerity program than before. Insofar as UKIP support is a good proxy for how an
individual voted in the 2016 referendum, the results suggest that austerity played a
major role in bringing about the referendum result. Arnorsson and Zoega (2018) study
another UK-based individual level survey (the British Election Study) and find that
negative attitudes towards immigration are correlated with voting Leave. Fox and Pearce
(2018) document that the generational divide – younger individuals are less Eurosceptic
than older ones – reflects a combination of generational effects (experience of the EU
during the formative years) and differences in access to education. In conclusion, the
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evidence, both from the analysis of aggregate vote share data and from the analysis of
individual vote choices, suggest that socio-economic deprivation, austerity, demographic
composition, and attitudes to immigration contributed to the referendum result. We
add to this literature by studying another aspect of the Brexit process – the sequence of
Meaningful Votes. This provides new insights into the link between the referendum result
in particular constituencies and the way that the MPs elected in those constituencies
subsequently acted.
3 The narrative: what actually happened?
The relationship with Europe has been a major issue for the UK’s centre-right Conser-
vative Party for the past 50 years. The UK joined the EU in 1973 under a Conservative
government, but with a broad base of political support: in a 1975 referendum on EU
membership 67% of voters and all major political parties supported membership.2 How-
ever, over the next 40 years, the EU moved from being primarily a trading bloc, to a
much closer economic and political union. This process was bitterly, but unsuccessfully,
opposed by a minority of Conservative Party MPs, especially in the early 1990s when
the Maastricht Treaty (an expansion of EU powers with a corresponding loss of UK
sovereignty) came into force (Sowemimo 1996). In parallel to this dynamic, a minority
of generally right-leaning voters favoured leaving the EU. Support for this position grew
in response to migration from Eastern European countries that joined the EU from 2004
onwards. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a single issue party advo-
cating the UK’s departure from the EU, began to gain significant support, principally at
the expense of the Conservative Party: in EU Parliamentary elections, UKIP came third
in 2004, second in 2009 and first in 2014 (e.g., Clarke et al. 2016).
In an attempt to both neutralise this growing voter support for UKIP and deal with in-
ternal divisions in the Conservative Party, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron
2At the time the bloc was called the EEC, becoming the EU in 1993. For simplicity this article uses
EU throughout.
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offered a referendum on EU membership as part of his re-election campaign in 2015,
alongside an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU.3 In the short
run, this was a successful policy: somewhat against expectations the Conservatives won
the 2015 election and UKIP support collapsed. In order to achieve Cameron’s second aim
of settling divisions in the Conservative Party, he allowed his MPs to campaign for either
side in the referendum, rather than requiring them to toe the party line and support con-
tinued membership of the EU (“Remain”). A significant minority of both backbench and
frontbench, i.e., those serving in the government, Conservatives subsequently campaigned
for leaving the EU (“Leave”).
The referendum was held on 23 June 2016, and resulted in an unexpected victory for
Leave, with 52% of the vote (and considerable geographic and demographic heterogeneity;
see Becker et al. (2017)). Cameron immediately resigned, and was replaced as Prime
Minister by Conservative MP Theresa May, who began the process of withdrawing from
the EU. Under EU law, a member state can leave the union by triggering Article 50
of the Lisbon Treaty. This gives that member state up to two years to negotiate a
Withdrawal Agreement with the EU, which sets out the terms under which it leaves
(covering everything from future customs arrangements to past pension liabilities). If
no agreement is in place at the two-year deadline, the member state can leave without
an agreement, or can ask for an extension to the negotiating period, during which the
country remains part of the EU.
Over the course of the two-year UK-EU negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement,
divisions within the Conservative Party deepened. On one side, many Leavers became
“Hard Brexiteers”, such as senior government minister Boris Johnson and members of
the European Research Group (ERG), who increasingly favoured a policy of little or
no future cooperation with the EU (“no deal”). On the other side, a smaller group
of former Remainers favoured a “Soft Brexit”, a close future relationship with the EU
3Bernholz et al. (2004) propose a reform of EU institutions that would protect the subsidiarity prin-
ciple and create effective checks and balances by breaking the Commission’s agenda monopoly. If that
proposal had been adopted in the mid-2000s, the critique levied against the EU by many British euro-
sceptics regarding the risk of an EU super state and democratic deficits would have been answered.
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resembling full membership. In November 2018, the final Withdrawal Agreement was
agreed between May and the EU. Although this did not specify all aspects of the future
UK-EU relationship, generally speaking it was a compromise somewhere between Hard
and Soft Brexit. Over the course of the negotiations, Johnson and several other high
profile Hard Brexiteer government ministers resigned in protest at compromises made by
May.
The final step was for Parliament to pass the Withdrawal Agreement. This requirement
itself was the result of an earlier parliamentary setback for May, when MPs succeeded -
against the wishes the government - in securing a “Meaningful Vote” on whatever terms
the UK eventually left the EU on. Five full days of parliamentary debate were set aside,
with the vote to be held on 11 December 2018. The Whips, MPs whose job it is to
ensure internal party discipline, worked hard to persuade potential rebels to back the
government. The main tool at their disposal is the prospect of future promotion in
government. Over the course of the debate, it became clear that May was not going to
win the vote, so she delayed it to 15 January 2019, in an attempt to buy more time in
which to persuade potential rebels. This was not successful: the first Meaningful Vote
was lost by the government by 432 to 202 votes, a majority of 230. This is the largest
defeat of a UK government in the history of Parliament.
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Table 1 shows the breakdown of MPs’ votes on the three Meaningful Votes by party
(panel A) and for the Conservative Party between front- and backbenchers (panel B).
From these data, we see that a number of factors contributed to May’s defeat. The
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) - a socially conservative, pro-Brexit, Northern Irish
party - had an agreement to support the Conservative government (who had lost its ma-
jority in the 2017 general election), but rebelled because in their view the Withdrawal
Agreement treated Northern Ireland differently to the rest of the UK (related to the so-
called Irish backstop problem). Very few pro-Brexit MPs from the centre-Left opposition
Labour Party ended up supporting the government.4 The centrist Liberal Democrats
(LD) and centre-left Scottish National Party (SNP) unanimously opposed the govern-
ment, but this was anticipated. By far the main factor behind May’s defeat was the huge
scale of the rebellion by her own backbench MPs. The frontbenchers with government
posts, on the other hand, toed the line and none of them rebelled (Table 1, panel B).
After the vote, the EU refused to renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement, and under
Article 50 time was running out before the UK would either have to ask for an extension
(politically very costly for the Conservatives) or leave without a deal (economically very
costly for the country). May therefore held a Second Meaningful Vote on 12 March 2019,
essentially a repeat vote on the policy that had been rejected two months ago (there were
some minor changes of interpretation of certain aspects of it). May and her Whips worked
hard to persuade rebel Conservative MPs, but again unsuccessfully: the government lost
by 391 to 242 votes, a majority of 149. Following this defeat, she asked the EU for an
extension, rather than leaving with no deal at end of March.
On the day the UK was originally supposed to leave the EU, May held a Third Mean-
ingful Vote, again on essentially the same Withdrawal Agreement. She and her Whips
made a final push to persuade rebels, increasingly with the threat to Hard Brexiteers
that Brexit may not happen at all if the Withdrawal Agreement was not passed. Again,
4Some predictions at the time of the first vote had up to 30 Labour MPs intending to vote with
the government. More generally, Brexit has produced serious internal divisions in the Labour Party,
though these did not have a major impact on the Meaningful Votes. Hence, this article focuses on the
Conservative Party.
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the government lost, though it cut its margin of defeat, from 344 to 286 votes, a majority
of 58. Johnson was the most prominent rebel to change his mind, and vote with the
government for the first time on this final vote.
Immediately after losing the third vote, May had to ask the EU for another extension of
Article 50, a further major political humiliation. In local and EU elections in May 2019,
the Conservatives did exceptionally badly. With the central policy of the government in
disarray and her party falling apart, the Prime Minister announced her resignation on 24
May 2019.5 Johnson, the frontrunner to replace May among Conservative Party members
(who select the party leader), won the ensuing leadership contest on 22 July 2019. A
proponent of Hard Brexit, he replaced much of May’s relatively balanced government
with a group of Hard Brexiteers in all the most senior government posts.
4 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that explains why politicians (hence-
forth MPs) may decide to vote against their party’s policy, and which we use to structure
our empirical investigation of the Meaningful Votes. For this reason, we formulate the
framework with reference to the Westminster system. This system is charaterized by a
high level of party unity in general, a clear government-opposition divide, agenda control
monopolized by the Cabinet within the governing party, and MPs elected in single mem-
ber districts with local party organizations having a significant input into who is selected
to represent the constituency (e.g., Baughman 2004).6
5Three major aspects of a breakdown in party unity are the following. May suffered a large number
of resignations of both junior and senior ministers: from 11 June 2017 onwards, 33 ministers resigned
over Brexit. Four Conservative MPs also defected from the party over Brexit, either to new parties or to
sit as independents. On 11 December 2018, the day the first Meaningful Vote was originally to be held,
Theresa May faced an internal Conservative Party vote of No Confidence, brought by Hard Brexit ERG
members, which she defeated.
6Broader legislative institutions and party structures help shape the costs and benefits for politicians
to deviate from the party line, and the constraints that party leaders face in creating party coherence
(Krehbiel 1993). The differences, for example, between a Westminster-type system and a US-type system
are often emphasised (Gaines and Garrett 1993). Stratmann (2006) leverages the mixed plurality
and proportional election system in Germany to show that federal politicians who are elected under
plurality rule from single member districts are more likely than those elected on a party list under
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MPs are members of political parties and are elected under these party labels and
on the party manifesto. These members share policy preferences and have common
goals, but only up to a point. Within a party there is, in general, substantial preference
heterogeneity on particular issues, with extreme and moderate MPs belonging to the
same party. This creates a fundamental tension for party members between supporting
the party’s policy (selected by the party leadership), which will appeal to some but not
to all, and pursuing their own preferred policy. Party leaders are, of course, well aware of
this and will seek to devise incentives and rules to enforce party discipline, create party
coherence and avoid mass rebellion on critical bills (Kam 2014). Party leaders can, in
principle, pursue this goal by controlling selection of candidates to be fielded (select only
candidates who will toe the party line), by controlling the policy agenda (make sure that
proposals are agreeable to most party members), by fostering socialization (Crowe 1986),
and by sharing and withholding the perks of government strategically.
Building on Muller and Strom (1999)’s tripartite model, we make a distinction be-
tween three factors that affect an MP’s decision to rebel against his or her party. The
first consideration is ideology: MPs care about policy and their position on a particu-
lar issue often deviates from the party’s official stance. This may motivate an MP to
rebel. The second consideration is career concerns: MPs usually want a legislative ca-
reer. In the Westminster system where agenda control is monopolized by the Cabinet,
political promotion is about government posts for members of the governing party and
about posts in the shadow cabinet for opposition MPs. This makes rebellion costly for
backbenchers as well as for frontbenchers (those with government or shadow government
posts) because party leaders can withhold promotion for rebellious backbenchers and
demote frontbenchers who do not toe the line.7 The third consideration is constituency
proportional representation to vote against the party lines in roll call votes. We restrict our attention
to the Westminster system and do not attempt to contrast this with other systems. For a comparative
study of the UK and the US, see Kirkland and Slapin (2018) and for a study of the European Parliament
see Benedetto and Hix (2007).
7Bertelli and Dolan (2009) present evidence from intervention in the House of Commons related to
Health care that is consistent with political careerism. The evidence on whether party leaders in actual
fact punish rebels by deneying them promotion is mixed. Eggers and Spirling (2016) study over 20,000
parliamentary divisions that took place between 1836 and 1910 in the British House of Commons and
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preferences and re-election. In the Westminster system, MPs are elected to represent
the voters in their constituency. As argued by, for example, Gaines and Garrett (1993),
Kirkland and Slapin (2018), Kam (2009) and many others, MPs in this system have an
incentive, albeit not necessarily as strong an incentive as US legislators, to develop a
persona independent of their party that connects them with their constituents and their
local party organization. They can do this publicly by deviating from their party’s policy
on issues that their voters and selectors in the local party organization care particularly
about in parliamentary divisions. This type of grandstanding signals their ideological pu-
rity, integrity or trustworthiness, gets them media exposure and can potentially insulate
them from the electoral unpopularity (in their constituency) of the party’s policy.8
Within the Public Choice tradition, MPs are viewed as rational decision makers who
need to navigate these three considerations when they decide if they should rebel on a
particular issue. More often than not, they pull in different directions and MPs find
themselves in the cross fire at the centre of a triangle with their voters, their ideolog-
ical conviction, and their party pulling them in different directions (Hix et al. 2007;
Morgenstern 2003; Saiegh 2011). Figure 1 illustrates this tripartite model of roll call
voting.
The costs and benefits of rebellion differ systematically between the governing and
opposition parties on the one hand, and within the governing party (or coalition) between
the frontbenchers with government posts and backbenchers without on the other. First,
with regard to the government-opposition split, Kirkland and Slapin (2018) argue that it
is MPs with extreme preference (far from the center) within the governing party that stand
to benefit the most from rebellion. This is because they can signal to their constituents
show that more loyal MPs were more likely to obtain ministerial posts. In contrast, Kauder et al. (2017)
study 218 roll call votes in the German federal parliament (Bundestag) and ask if rebels are punished
by party leaders by being allocated a less attractive position on the party list in the next election. They
find that parties do not punish politicians who have voted against the party line in this way.
8Campbell et al. (2019) and Vivyan and Wagner (2012) present evidence from the UK that this
strategy can help MPs seeking re-election. Pattie et al. (1994) show that rebellion on high profile issues,
such as capital punishment or the poll tax, had an effect on the re-election prospects of the rebels, but
otherwise they find no discernible effects. Ragusa (2016) shows that US legislators take more extreme
positions if they won election to the Senate after representing a partisan district.
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that they are “ideologically pure” by voting against the party line and expect to be
electorally rewarded for this. For opposition MPs, the incentive to break the party line
to signal “ideological purity” is weaker. Assuming that the opposition policy is to vote
against the government’s policy, neither extreme nor moderate (who are relatively close
to the center) opposition MPs are likely to gain electorally by breaking the party line
as most of their voters would, in fact, prefer the opposition party’s official policy stance
to that of the government. All rebels, of course, face the cost of the disciplinary actions
taken by their party leaders in response, but there is a clear asymmetry in the benefit of
rebellion between the party of government and the opposition. This logic is consistent
with the fact that it is MPs with extreme views that tend to rebel in the House of
Commons and that MPs from the governing party are more likely to rebel than MPs
from the opposition (e.g., Benedetto and Hix 2007; Kirkland and Slapin 2018).
Second, the within party difference between front- and backbenchers is important and
arises from the fact that frontbenchers have much more to lose from rebelling (their perks
and posts, the ability to formulate policy, etc.). Backbenchers also have to mind their
political careers, but those who have been “passed over” for political promotion or those
who have previously been demoted from the frontbench have less to lose (Kam 2009).
This logic suggests that it is amongst “old” backbenchers that most rebels can be found.
The cause of a backbench revolt by this group of MPs may not just be that they are
unhappy with the party’s policy, but also may be because they hope to destabilize the
leader under whom their political careers have stalled. This gives rise to two distinct
career motives. On the one hand, MPs can promote their careers by pleasing the current
leadership of their party if the leadership is sufficiently stable to justify the expectation
of rewards for good behaviour. On the other hand, MPs can promote their careers by
destabilising the current leader of their party and encouraging a leadership challenge. If
successful, the revolting MPs may reasonably expect to be rewarded by the new leader.
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Notes: Own illustration
Figure 1: The MPs in crossfire: The tripartite model
5 The data and operationalization
Our objective is to study how MPs resolved the tension among their personal preference,
career concerns and constituency preferences in the context of the three Meaningful Votes
on the Withdrawal Agreement that the May government negotiated with the European
Union (henceforth “May’s deal”). The raw numbers (reported in Table 1) clearly show
that party cohesion was strong among all opposition parties. All but 6 opposition MPs
in the first Meaningful Vote and 9 in the third toed their respective party lines.9 An
implication, then, is that the rebellion that defeated May’s deal three times in a row
took place within the governing Conservative Party.10 Our focus is, therefore, on the 317
Conservative MPs. We have recorded how each of them voted in the three Meaningful
9Dewan and Spirling (2011) develop a game theoretical argument for why opposition parties are able
to act coherently in spite of the temptation of some of their MPs to support the government’s policy.
The source of such strategic opposition is that if the opposition as a block vote against the government
(and no opposition MP deviates from this), it can force the government to propose a more moderate
policy than otherwise and this is in the interest of all opposition MPs.
10The “rebellion” by the 10 MPs from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) upon which May’s
government relayed for a parliamentary majority was also important but not pivotal.
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Votes and coded the indicator variable VOTE as one if the (Conservative) MP supported
the Withdrawal Agreement and voted with the government and zero if the MP rebelled
by voting against.
While theoretically the three factors of the tripartite model – ideology, career concerns
and constituency preferences – are distinct, in practice they often overlap and it is a
challenge to measure them independently. With this caveat in mind, we now explain
how we operationalize and measure them. First, we operationalize the MPs’ ideological
position on the Brexit question by how they voted and campaigned in the 2016 referendum
on leaving the European Union. For Conservative MPs, this, arguably, was a “free vote”
where the MPs could vote and campaign as they liked. The official policy of the Cameron
government that had called the referendum was to vote Remain, but many leading Tory
MPs – most notably Boris Johnson and Michael Gove – campaigned to leave. We code
the dummy variable REMAIN MP as one if the MP voted and campaigned for remain
in the referendum and zero otherwise. We argue that this expressed preference is a good
measure of each MP’s personal judgement of the merits of leaving the EU.11 However,
we acknowledge that how the MPs voted in the referendum can, in principle, also reflect
career concerns and constituency preferences. In our judgement, it is unlikely that many
Conservative MPs viewed their position on the referendum question as a career move. It
was widely expected that the Remain side would win and the Cameron government was
unlikely to reward or punish the MPs for which stance they took, as Cameron had called
the referendum, at least partly, to settle the “Europe question” within the Conservative
party once and for all. It is harder to dismiss the possibility that a significant number
of MPs (who did not have strong views on the issue of Europe) choose their position
to match the (perceived) preference of their constituents. If that were the case, we
would expect there to be a strong correlation between an MP’s position and that of
his or her constituents. In fact, the correlation between the leave stance of the MPs
11Moreover, it is plausible to argue that most of them were voting socio-tropically, i.e., were thinking
about what, in their view, was best for the country, rather than ego-tropically, i.e., were thinking about
the private benefit that they would derive from the result. See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier (2013) for a discussion of the distinction between ego- and socio-tropic voting.
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and the Leave vote share of their constituents is just 0.119. This does, of course, not
rule out that the dummy variable REMAIN MP captures a mixture of personal and
constituency preferences. To bolster our interpretation of the variable, we exploit in a
robustness check that Theresa May called a general election in 2017 and that we can make
a distinction between (current) MPs who were elected before (in 2015) and after (in 2017)
the referendum. It is reasonable to expect that constituency preferences played little role
for the stance taken by the “MPs” who did not get elected till after the referendum
and for them, the expressed preference in the referendum is a reflection of their personal
views. We also stress that we condition on a host of constituency characteristics and on
the share of leave voters in the estimations. This helps isolate the variation in REMAIN
MP that represents the MPs’ personal preference from the variation that may be due to
constituency preferences.
Second, to operationalize career concerns, we make a distinction between “junior” and
“senior” backbenchers, on the one hand, and between backbenchers and members of
the government (frontbenchers) on the other. As discuss above, the group of “senior”
backbenchers, i.e., those with long parliamentary tenure, consists of two sub-groups: one
group has been “passed over” for government jobs in the past and have little prospect of
ever getting one under the current Prime Minister; the other consists of MPs who have
previously served in government but have resigned or been dismissed. Either group has
little to lose from rebellion as there are limits to what the government and its Whips can
do to sanction them for such behaviour since they have little chance of promotion under
the current leadership. They are, therefore, ceteris paribus more likely to rebel than
“junior” MPs who are newly elected to their seat and who are particularly concerned
with their political career prospects under the current leadership. On top of this, if the
power base of the current leadership inside the party is fragile, then MPs may anticipate
that if they rebel, the current leadership will eventually fall and a new Prime Minster
will be appointed. Likely, the new leader will replace most of the old frontbench and
promote MPs from the backbench. Consequently, MPs who think they have a fair chance
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of being part of a new government have an extra incentive to rebel. However, this strategy
is, arguably, more appealing to “senior” than to ‘junior” backbenchers who hope to get
back into government. So, “junior” MPs have two reasons to toe the party line: they
fear sanctions from the current government and they do not anticipate rewards from a
new government should the current government fall because of rebellion. We code two
variables to capture this. The first, FRONTBENCH, is a dummy variable coded one if
the MP holds a position in government and zero otherwise. The second, JUNIOR MP, is
a dummy variable coded one if the MP was first elected in either in 2015 or 2017, and zero
otherwise.12 The fact that we observe the same MPs voting on the same policy three times
and we observe a change in Prime Minister (from Theresa May to Boris Johnson) opens
a window of opportunity for a more refined test of career concerns related to destabilising
the current leader. We return to this in Section 7.2.
Third, the Brexit situation provides a unique opportunity to measure the constituency
preferences since we know, in the aggregate, how voters in each constituency voted in the
2016 referendum. We code the variable LEAVE VOTE SHARE as the share of voters in
each constituency who voted Leave in the referendum.
We have also collected information on many other MP and constituency specific char-
acteristics. The constituency specific control variables include population size, the un-
employment rate, the share of foreign born residents, the share of residents with higher
education, the age structure of the constituency, and share of public employment, all
measured at the parliamentary constituency level. The MP specific control variables
include the MP’s age, gender and win margin in the 2017 election. We also include a
rebellion index that proxies for the MP’s tendency to rebel against their own party in the
past. We have standardized these data so that all non-binary variables have a standard
deviation of one. Appendix A lists and defines all the variables we use in the statistical
analysis and provides details on the sources. Table 2 reports summary statistics.
12The most recent previous election was in 2010, so by the time of the Meaningful Votes in 2018 an
MP with JUNIOR MP=0 had served as an MP for at least 8 years, long enough to be considered for a
government position.
19
Ta
bl
e
2:
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
ist
ic
s
fo
r
sa
m
pl
e
of
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
Ba
ck
be
nc
h
M
Ps
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
) N
(2
)
M
ea
n
(3
)
St
d.
D
ev
.
(4
)
M
in
.
(5
)
M
ax
.
V
O
T
E
(B
in
ar
y)
66
2
0.
64
8
0.
47
8
0
1
V
O
T
E
C
H
A
N
G
E
1-
2*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
33
1
0.
47
2
0
1
V
O
T
E
C
H
A
N
G
E
2-
3*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
35
6
0.
48
1
0
1
M
ai
n
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
R
EM
A
IN
M
P
(B
in
ar
y)
22
2
0.
46
4
0.
50
0
0
1
JU
N
IO
R
M
P
(B
in
ar
y)
22
2
0.
37
4
0.
48
5
0
1
LE
AV
E
V
O
T
E
SH
A
R
E
(%
)
22
2
55
.1
8.
77
25
.7
74
.9
JO
H
N
SO
N
G
O
V
ER
N
M
EN
T
SE
N
IO
R
*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
06
8
0.
25
2
0
1
JO
H
N
SO
N
G
O
V
ER
N
M
EN
T
JU
N
IO
R
*
(B
in
ar
y)
11
8
0.
07
6
0.
26
7
0
1
Co
ns
tit
ue
nc
y
Co
nt
ro
ls
FO
R
EI
G
N
(%
)
22
2
8.
56
6.
51
2.
40
46
.9
PO
PU
LA
T
IO
N
(N
o.
)
22
2
10
0,
16
8
11
,4
91
58
,9
41
14
0,
98
4
U
N
EM
PL
O
Y
ED
(%
)
22
2
2.
06
1.
07
0.
54
7
6.
03
PU
BL
IC
(%
)
22
2
18
.1
6.
75
5.
60
47
.1
ED
U
C
AT
ED
(%
)
22
2
27
.2
6.
94
12
.3
55
.2
W
O
R
K
IN
G
A
G
E
(%
)
22
2
60
.4
2.
88
51
.2
70
.0
M
P
Co
nt
ro
ls
A
G
E
(Y
rs
.)
22
2
52
.3
10
.8
27
.0
78
.0
FE
M
A
LE
(B
in
ar
y)
22
2
0.
17
6
0.
38
1
0
1
R
EB
EL
LI
O
N
(I
nd
ex
)
22
2
0.
72
6
1.
87
0
21
.8
W
IN
M
A
RG
IN
(p
p)
22
2
22
.6
12
.8
0.
06
6
49
.7
N
ot
e:
A
pp
en
di
x
A
lis
ts
th
e
de
fin
iti
on
s
of
th
e
va
ria
bl
es
an
d
pr
ov
id
es
de
ta
ils
re
ga
rd
in
g
th
e
so
ur
ce
s.
A
pp
en
di
x
Ta
bl
e
A
1
pr
ov
id
es
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
ist
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
al
lC
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
M
Ps
.
*
T
he
se
va
ria
bl
es
ar
e
co
de
d
fo
r
th
e
su
b-
sa
m
pl
e
of
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e
ba
ck
be
nc
h
M
Ps
w
ho
vo
te
d
ag
ai
ns
t
th
e
W
ith
dr
aw
al
A
gr
ee
m
en
t
in
th
e
fir
st
M
ea
ni
ng
fu
lV
ot
e.
Se
e
Se
ct
io
n
7.
2
fo
r
m
or
e
de
ta
ils
.
20
6 Estimation strategy
We want to estimate the following statistical model
VOTEi,v = F [αv + β1IDEOLOGYi + β2CAREERi + β3CONSTITUENCYi + β4Xi] (1)
where i is the index for a Conservative MP (and for his or her constituency since all
constituencies are single seat), v is the index for the three Meaningful Votes with v ∈
{1, 2, 3} and Xi is a vector of control variables. We want to understand how the three
forces – ideology, career concerns and constituency preferences – influence the decision
to rebel and vote against May’s deal. We use REMAIN MP to proxy for ideology,
LEAVE VOTE SHARE to proxy for constituency preferences and JUNIOR MP and
FRONTBENCH to proxy for career concerns in the main specifications, but consider a
number of refinements aimed at validating the three proxies. We estimate equation (1)
with a probit estimator and, in specifications where we pool the three voters, we cluster
the standard errors at the constituency level to account for the fact that we study a
sequence of votes.
We know from Table 1 that all Conservative frontbench MPs supported the govern-
ment’s Withdrawal Agreement in the three Meaningful Votes. This implies that we can-
not include FRONTBENCH in the probit specification (the variable predicts the outcome
perfectly and is dropped). For this reason, the main analysis is restricted to the sample
of Conservative backbenchers where we have variation in VOTE. To compare the effect
of the FRONTBENCH variable to the others, we estimate a linear probability model on
the sample of all Conservative MPs. We also know from Table 1 that 81 Conservative
(backbench) MPs changed their vote from opposition to support in the sequence of votes.
To study why they did this, we estimate a version of equation (1) where we replace VOTE
with the variables VOTE CHANGE 1-2 or VOTE CHANGE 2-3 that records if the MPs
changed their vote in the second or third Meaningful Vote relative to the position they
took in the previous vote.
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7 Results
We present the results in three subsections. In Section 7.1, we discuss the main results
and a validation test of the proxy for the MPs’ personal preference. In Section 7.2, we test
for career concerns related to promotion to government posts in a future administration.
In Section 7.3, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects across three dimensions related
to electoral competition, history of rebellion, and the MP’s personal preference.
7.1 Main Results
Table 3 reports the main results. Column (1) shows a parsimonious specification without
any control variables other than the dummy variables for the three Meaningful Votes, col-
umn (2) adds the constituency specific control variables, and column (3) adds MP-specific
control variables. We report marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the variables. In
column (4), we report the results from a linear probability model estimated with Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS) where we can include all Conservative MPs, including those
serving on the frontbench in the sample.
Looking across Table 3, we observe that the four variables capturing personal prefer-
ences (REMAIN MP), career concerns (JUNIOR MP and FRONTBENCH ), and con-
stituency preferences (LEAVE VOTE SHARE) are all strongly correlated with MP sup-
port for May’s deal. The effects are stable across specifications as we add the control
variables, except for LEAVE VOTE SHARE which is very imprecisely estimated in the
parsimonious specification in column (1). This is, perhaps, not so surprising because the
constituency specific controls include many of the variables – such as the unemployment
rate and the share of highly educated residents in the constituency – which we know
are correlated with the share of Leave voters (see, e.g., Becker et al. 2017). Specif-
ically, we find that REMAIN MP and the two career concerns variables JUNIOR MP
and FRONTBENCH are positively correlated with the probability of voting for May’s
deal and that LEAVE VOTE SHARE is negatively correlated. That is, MPs who had
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Table 3: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in the three Mean-
ingful Votes combined
Backbencher sample Full Sample
Outcome: VOTE (1)Probit
(2)
Probit
(3)
Probit
(4)
OLS
FRONTBENCH - - - 0.327***
(0.035)
[0.000]
REMAIN MP 0.381*** 0.373*** 0.398*** 0.266***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.034)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.171*** 0.128** 0.204*** 0.127***
(0.053) (0.057) (0.069) (0.046)
[0.001] [0.025] [0.003] [0.006]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.003 -0.157** -0.170** -0.079**
(0.029) (0.064) (0.067) (0.035)
[0.929] [0.013] [0.011] [0.027]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES YES
N 662 662 662 941
(Pseudo-)R2 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.33
Note: Columns (1)-(3) report Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers and column (4) reports OLS estimates for the
sample of all Conservative MPs. The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever
an MP voted in support of the Withdrawal Agreement and zero when the MP rebelled by voting against.
REMAIN MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016
referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons
either in 2015 or 2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the
referendum in 2016 in each constituency; and FRONTBENCH is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP
holds a position in government. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include
population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share
of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age.
MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin
in the last election. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values
are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
voted and campaigned against leaving the EU in the referendum were almost 40 percent
more likely to support May’s deal than other MPs, while MPs representing constituencies
with (one standard deviation) more Leave voters were 17 percent less likely to support
the deal. Junior MPs mindful of their career prospects under a May government were
about 20 percent more likely to support May’s deal and so were frontbench MPs serving
in the government (column (4)). Relatively speaking, ideology (as captured by the MP’s
revealed preference for membership of the EU) appears to be about twice as important a
factor as career concerns and constituency preferences. In sum, we conclude that the re-
bellion did not come from MPs with strong career concerns. This is in line with previous
findings in the literature on roll call rebels (see, e.g., Benedetto and Hix 2007). Rather,
and somewhat paradoxically, rebellion came from MPs who had supported Leave in the
referendum and from MPs elected in Leave leaning constituencies.
Table 4 reports the results (corresponding to the specification with the full set of
control variables (Table 3, column (3)) for each of the three Meaningful Votes separately.
This is important to consider because there was a significant shift in the scale of the
rebellion from 118 Conservative MPs in the first Meaningful Vote down to 37 in the
third. The results are qualitatively similar across the three votes: the marginal effects
have the same sign and are statistically significant. Importantly, the tests for whether the
marginal effects are the same in the first and third vote reported in column (4), however,
show the quantitative importance of ideology and career concerns, but not constituency
preferences, weakened over time, in line with the fact that more and more backbenchers
rallied behind May’s deal as time went on.13 To illustrate, relative to the first Meaningful
Vote, where the MPs who had voted Remain in 2016 were 56 percent more likely to
support May’s deal, the point estimate dropped down to 16 percent by the time of the
third Meaningful Vote. We also note that the part of the variance explained by the three
factors (as measured by the Pseudo-R2) drops from 30 to 18 percent.
13It is not straight-forward to test for this in a non-linear model. We follow Mood (2010) and use a
one-sided z-test to test, for each variable, if one marginal effect (rather than the raw probit coefficients)
is greater (smaller) than the other. We use the same procedure in the heterogeneity analysis in Section
7.3.
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Table 4: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal agreement in each of the three
Meaningful Votes separately
Outcome: VOTE (1)1st Vote
(2)
2nd Vote
(3)
3rd Vote
(4)
Diff. p-value
REMAIN MP 0.563*** 0.405*** 0.161*** 0.000
(0.062) (0.059) (0.044)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.282*** 0.178** 0.119** 0.086
(0.109) (0.087) (0.049)
[0.010] [0.042] [0.015]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.203** -0.148* -0.126** 0.253
(0.103) (0.087) (0.054)
[0.049] [0.090] [0.020]
Controls YES YES YES -
N 221 220 221 -
Pseudo-R2 0.30 0.22 0.18 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers separately for the three Meaningful Votes. The
dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the
Withdrawal Agreement and zero if the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017; and LEAVE
VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each
constituency. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include population size, the
unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents with
a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls include
gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin in the last election.
The p-value reported in column (4) is associated with the one-sided null hypothesis that the marginal
effect of the respective row variable is numerically smaller in the third vote (column (3)) than in the first
vote (column (1)). Robust standard errors (in round brackets); p-values are given in [square brackets];
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
As discussed above, we cannot fully rule out that the estimated marginal effect of
REMAIN MP, which records the stance of each MP in the 2016 referendum, captures
constituency as well as the MP’s personal preferences. The fact that we condition on
the LEAVE VOTE SHARE and, thus, estimate the effect of REMAIN MP holding the
preference among the voters of each constituency for leaving the European Union constant
militates against this. Yet, it is important to consider the issue further.
The MPs who voted on the Withdrawal Agreement in the three Meaningful Votes can
be divided into two groups: those who were elected for the first time in the general election
in 2017, i.e., after the referendum, and those who were elected (or re-elected) in 2015 (and
re-elected in 2017), i.e., before the referendum. If the MPs’ stance in the referendum were
selected strategically to match constituency preferences, we conjecture that the incentive
to do this would be much stronger for those who were already MPs at the time of the
referendum. After all the MPs elected for the first time in 2017 did not know in 2016
that they would be running in a general election shortly after the referendum and, thus,
their incentive to match their stance with that of their future voters is arguable much
lower. For them, it stands to reason that the vote in the referendum does reflect their
personal preference.
Given that, we can isolate the effect of the MPs’ personal preference by restricting the
sample to the Conservative backbench MPs elected in 2017 and test if those who voted
Remain are more likely than those who did not to vote for the Withdrawal Agreement.
Table 5 reports three specifications with different sets of control variables similar to Table
3. We see that REMAIN MP is statistically significant in all specifications, and that the
marginal effect is between 28 and 34 percent compared to 37 to 39 percent in the full
sample (see Table 3). This bolsters our interpretation of REMAIN MP as a plausible
proxy for the MPs’ personal preference.
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Table 5: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement for the Conservative
backbench MPs elected in 2017
Outcome: VOTE (1)Probit
(2)
Probit
(3)
Probit
REMAIN MP 0.299*** 0.286*** 0.341***
(0.103) (0.092) (0.097)
[0.004] [0.002] [0.000]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.073** -0.149** -0.171**
(0.037) (0.067) (0.069)
[0.049] [0.025] [0.013]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES
N 104 104 104
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.35 0.39
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers elected in the 2017 general election. Since all
these MPs are “junior” MPs, the variable JUNIOR MP is omitted. The other variables are as in the
specifications reported in Table 3, columns (1) to (3). Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered
at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
7.2 Career concerns and leader replacement
So far we have assumed that the MPs’ career concerns are shaped by the ability of the
current party leadership to reward loyalty and punish rebellion. However, the prospect
of a career under a new party leader can also be a strong motivator to rebel against the
current leadership, particularly so if its position is perceived to be weak and rebellion is a
means to further weaken it. In the context of the three Meaningful Votes, it is clear that
the position of the May government was fragile. This, combined with the fact that she was
eventually replaced by Boris Johnson as Prime Minster, opens up a unique opportunity
to test if the backbenchers’ vote choices in the Meaningful Votes were influenced by the
prospect of a promotion under a future Johnson-led government. To do this, we note
two points. Firstly, since Theresa May had “survived” an internal vote of no confidence
before the first meaningful vote, it is reasonable to assume that expectations of a change
in leadership were lower at the time of the first vote than at the time of the last. This
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motivates investigating why some Conservative backbenchers changed their position on
the Withdrawal Agreement between the first, second and third vote. Secondly, Johnson
was widely tipped as the most likely candidate to replace May if her administration were
to fall. He announced just before the third Meaningful Vote that he would support it
after having vote against in the previous votes.14 We can use this fact to test if those
MPs who (ex post) got promoted to his new administration were “loyal” to him and also
switched their vote when he did. If so, this would be consistent with the prospect of
promotion under a future government being a motivator.
To implement this test, we code the two variables JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SE-
NIOR and JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR which are equal to one if an MP got a
senior (Cabinet) or a junior (non-cabinet) post, respectively, in the Johnson administra-
tion. We, then, test whether these variables can predict if the 118 Conservative backbench
MPs who voted against the Withdrawal Agreement in the first Meaningful Vote changed
the way they voted in subsequent votes. Table 6 reports the results. In column (1), the
dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 1-2 ) is a dummy equal to 1 for MPs who voted
against in the first Meaningful Vote and for in the second (zero otherwise). In column
(2), the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 2-3 ) is a dummy equal to one for MPs
who voted against in the second Meaningful Vote and for in the third (zero otherwise).
While our results should be interpreted cautiously due to the small sample size,15 we
see that the MPs who got appointed to senior positions in the Johnson administration
were 33 percent less likely to change their vote between the first and the second vote,
but 34 percent more likely to switch between the second and the third vote. Those who
got junior positions were not more likely to change their vote than other MPs. This is
consistent with a “follow Johnson effect” whereby the rebels who anticipated (correctly)
they might get senior posts in a Johnson administration changed their vote when Johnson
14Since the DUP was sure to vote against for a third time, it would have required a major rebellion in
the Labour Party to create a majority for the Withdrawal Agreement, even if most of the rebels on the
Conservative backbench switched their vote. So, Johnson’s change of mind was never likely to make a
material difference for the outcome of the vote.
15Only about seven percent of the backbenchers who initially voting against the Withdrawal Agreement
are now part of the Johnson Cabinet.
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Table 6: Voting with Johnson: The probability that the 118 Conservative backbench
MPs who voted against the Withdrawal Agreement in the first Meaningful
vote subsequently switched their vote
Outcome: VOTE CHANGE (1)Switch in 2nd vote
(2)
Switch in 3rd vote
JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SENIOR -0.333*** 0.339**
(0.091) (0.142)
[0.000] [0.018]
JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR 0.140 0.005
(0.190) (0.187)
[0.462] [0.977]
REMAIN MP 0.092 -0.016
(0.108) (0.104)
[0.398] [0.880]
JUNIOR MP -0.079 0.131
(0.132) (0.130)
[0.552] [0.313]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE 0.062 -0.212*
(0.125) (0.125)
[0.623] [0.094]
Const. Controls YES YES
MP Controls YES YES
N 118 118
R2 0.17 0.17
Note: The sample is restricted to Conservative backbencher MPs who voted against the Withdrawal
Agreement in the first Meaningful Vote. In column 1, the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 1-2 )
is a dummy equal to 1 for MPs who voted against in the first Meaningful Vote and for in the second
(zero otherwise). In column (2), the dependent variable (VOTE CHANGE 2-3 ) is a dummy equal to
one for MPs who voted against in the second Meaningful Vote and for in the third (zero otherwise).
The dummy variable JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SENIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed
to a senior (Cabinet) position in the Johnson administration (zero otherwise). The dummy variable
JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed to a junior (non-cabinet)
governmental position in the Johnson administration (zero otherwise). The model is a linear probability
model estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The probit estimates are similar. However, because
no MP who got a senior position in the Johnson administration started supporting Theresa May’s deal in
the 2nd vote, we cannot estimate the specification in column (1) with that estimator. REMAIN MP is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR
MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or
2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum
in 2016 in each constituency. Constituency controls include population size, the unemployment rate,
the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents with a higher education
degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls include gender, age, an index
of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin in the last election. Robust standard errors
are reported in (round brackets); p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
did. Although there could be other explanations for this pattern, it suggests that career
concerns related to rewards by a future leader played a role.
7.3 Heterogeneity
We explore three dimensions of heterogeneity in the main results: constituency competi-
tiveness, history of rebellion, and the MP’s personal preference.16
7.3.1 Constituency Competitiveness
The relative importance of ideology, career concerns and constituency preferences in an
MP’s rebellion calculus is likely to be influenced by how competitive the MP’s seat is. An
MP elected to a safe seat by a large majority is likely to put more weight on career concerns
and ideology than on constituency preferences compared to an MP elected to a marginal
seat. To investigate this hypothesis, we split the sample of Conservative backbench MPs
into sub-samples defined by their win margin in the 2017 general election and re-estimate
equation (1) on these sub-samples. We define a seat as marginal if it is in the bottom 25
percent of the distribution with win margins below 11pp and safe if it is in top 50 percent
of the distribution with a win margin above 23pp.
Table 7 reports the results. Column (1) repeats the baseline model estimated on the en-
tire sample of backbench Conservative MPs. In columns (2) and (3), we report the results
for safe and marginal seats separately. We observe that there is a remarkable difference
in the relative importance of career concerns and constituency preferences between MPs
elected in safe and marginal seats. Specifically, the effect of career concerns is signifi-
cantly weaker in marginal constituencies, while the influence of constituency preferences
is significantly stronger. This is in line with previous findings by Baughman (2004) who
associates the greater attention paid to constituency preferences by MPs under electoral
16Methodologically, we study heterogeneity by splitting the sample along the relevant dimension and
then test if the marginal effects of the core variables are different in the two sub-samples. An alternative is
to introduce interaction terms. However, since we are interested in heterogeneity across many variables,
this approach, despite the efficiency gain associated with a bigger sample, is inferior for our purposes.
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threat with a strategy to pander to local party officials whose support is essential for
future electoral success. Likewise, Kauder and Potrafke (2019) show that conservative
politicians elected in safe rather than in contested districts were less likely to support
same-sex marriage a roll call vote in the national German parliament (Bundestag).
While these results should not necessarily be interpreted causally as win margins may
be correlated with unobserved mediating factors, we do believe that they bring credibility
to our main findings. If the main results from Table 3 were wholly spurious, there would
be no reason to expect the particular pattern that we observe when the sample is split
between safe and marginal seats. Hence, while making a causal claim is not possible with
the data at hand, the results in Table 7 are in line with what we would theoretically
expect, which is reassuring.
7.3.2 History of Rebellion
While many MPs are loyal, some MPs are serial rebels and have a long history of voting
against their party. Famous examples include the now leader of the Labour Party Jeremy
Corbyn and the shadow Chancellor John McDonnell and amongst the Conservatives, the
MP Philip Hollobone. We conjecture that an MP with a history of rebellion would
respond differently to, in particular, career concerns than an MP who has always been
loyal. An MP who has already rebelled at least once may, from a career point of view,
perceive another rebellious vote differently from an MP who has been loyal in the past.
Based on the the “rebellion history index” constructed by the website The Public
Whip from divisions in the House of Commons over the period June 2017 to November
2018 (i.e., before the first Meaningful Vote), we have divided the sample of Conservative
backbench MPs into two groups: those who never rebelled in the past and for whom a
vote against the Withdrawal Agreement would be their first rebellious vote (first-time
rebels) and those who rebelled at least once prior to the first Meaningful Vote (serial
rebels). We re-estimate equation (1) on the two sub-samples. Table 8 reports the results.
From column (2) and (3), we observe that based on a comparison of the marginal effects
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Table 7: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in safe versus marginal
seats
Outcome: VOTE (1)Baseline
(2)
Safe
(3)
Marginal
(4)
Diff. p-value
REMAIN MP 0.398*** 0.487*** 0.420*** 0.280
(0.048) (0.075) (0.087)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.204*** 0.263** -0.073 0.016
(0.069) (0.111) (0.112)
[0.003] [0.017] [0.516]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.170** -0.078 -0.294*** 0.064
(0.067) (0.112) (0.087)
[0.011] [0.488] [0.001]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES -
Controls YES YES YES -
N 662 330 164 -
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.30 0.45 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers and for the three votes combined. Column (1)
replicates the full baseline results from Table 3. Columns (2) and (3) estimate the model separately
for safe (top 50 percent of the distribution) and marginal (bottom 25 percent of the distribution). The
dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the
Withdrawal Agreement and zero if the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017; and LEAVE
VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each
constituency. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include population size, the
unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents with
a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls include
gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin in the last election. The
p-value reported in column (4) is associated with the one-sided null hypothesis that the marginal effect
of the respective row variable is larger (smaller) in one sub-sample than in the other. Standard errors (in
round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01
(24 versus 16 percent), career concerns do appear to matter more for first-time than
for serial rebels, but the difference is not statistically significant. The MP’s history of
rebellion, thus, did not make much of a difference for how they voted.
Table 8: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement, breakdown by history
of past rebellion
Outcome: VOTE (1)Baseline
(2)
First-time rebels
(3)
Serial rebels
(4)
Diff. p-value
REMAIN MP 0.377*** 0.403*** 0.412*** 0.462
(0.049) (0.063) (0.073)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.209*** 0.238** 0.164* 0.298
(0.068) (0.100) (0.098)
[0.002] [0.018] [0.093]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.173** -0.247** -0.179** 0.312
(0.068) (0.111) (0.083)
[0.011] [0.027] [0.030]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES -
Controls YES YES YES -
N 662 306 356 -
Pseudo-R2 0.26 0.32 0.26 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers and the three Meaningful Votes combined. Col-
umn (1) replicates the full baseline results from Table 3, excluding the rebellion index control. Column
(2) restricts the sample to MPs who had not rebelled prior to November 2017 (first-time rebels); column
(3) restricts the sample to MPs who had rebelled at least once before (serial rebels). The dependent
variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the Withdrawal
Agreement and zero if the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017; and LEAVE
VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each
constituency. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include population size,
the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents
with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls
include gender, age, and the MP’s win margin in the last election. The p-value reported in column (4)
is associated with the one-sided null hypothesis that the marginal effect of the respective row variable is
larger (smaller) in one sub-sample than in the other. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered
at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
7.3.3 The MPs’ personal Brexit preference
We have already established that conservative backbench MPs who supported Remain in
the referendum in 2016 were more likely to support May’s deal in the three Meaningful
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Votes than Leave MPs. We split the sample into Leave and Remain MP sub-samples in
order to investigate if the two groups of MPs reacted differently to career concerns and
to constituency preferences. Table 9 reports the results. We observe that Remain MPs
reacted to career concerns and not to constituency preferences, while for Leave MPs,
career concerns appear to play no role, but they were more likely to vote against the deal
if elected in constituencies with a high share of Leave voters. However, despite the fact
that the marginal effect on JUNIOR MP is insignificant for Leave MPs and significant for
Remain MPs, the difference between the two marginal effects is not statistically signifi-
cant. For LEAVE VOTE SHARE the difference is significant. One interpretation of this
is that Leave MPs, many of whom belong to the European Research Group (ERG) led
by Jacob Rees-Mogg, signalled “ideological purity” to the Leave voters and local party
officials in their constituency by voting against May’s deal which they considered to be
too “soft” (involving a risk of locking the UK into a customs union via the so-called Irish
backstop). Remain MPs with a political career to look after, on the other hand, could
signal purity to their Leave voters and local party officials by “converting” (accepting the
result of the referendum) and supporting May’s attempt to get a deal through.
8 Conclusions
We study the three Meaningful Votes that took place in the British House of Common
between January and March 2019 in which the Conservative government’s Withdrawal
Agreement with the European Union was decisively defeated. Instrumental for this was
a major revolt on the Conservative backbench. We argue that this specific high stakes
situation can provide insights into why politicians revolt against their own party more
generally. We find evidence that personal preference (ideology), constituency preferences
and career concerns mattered. We also find (suggestive) evidence that the rebellion on
the Conservative backbench was, in part, motivated by the prospect of bringing the May
government down. An interesting question for future research is to study the electoral
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Table 9: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement for Remain and Leave
MPs
Outcome: VOTE (1)Baseline
(2)
Leave MPs
(3)
Remain MPs
(4)
Diff. p-value
JUNIOR MP 0.187*** 0.112 0.208*** 0.227
(0.068) (0.114) (0.059)
[0.006] [0.327] [0.000]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.158** -0.206** -0.043 0.083
(0.071) (0.097) (0.067)
[0.025] [0.033] [0.520]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES -
Controls YES YES YES -
N 662 354 308 -
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.21 0.27 -
Note: The table reports Probit estimates (marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables) for the sample of Conservative backbenchers for the three Meaningful Votes combined. Column
(1) replicates the baseline result from Table 3, excluding REMAIN MP. Column (2) restricts the sample
to MPs who voted Leave in the 2016 referendum (Leave MPs). Column (3) restricts the sample to
MPs who voted Remain in the referendum (Remain MPs). The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary
variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the Withdrawal Agreement and zero if the MP
rebelled. REMAIN MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in
the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of
Commons either in 2015 or 2017; and LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who
voted Leave in the referendum in 2016 in each constituency. All specifications include vote dummies.
Constituency controls include population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working
in the public sector, the share of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents
who are of working age. MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and
the MP’s win margin in the last election. The p-value reported in column (4) is associated with the
one-sided null hypothesis that the marginal effect of the respective row variable is larger (smaller) in
one sub-sample than in the other. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency
level; p-values are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
consequences of the rebellion for individual MPs. That is, do voters reward or punish
them for the way they voted on this highly contentious issue?
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Appendix
Appendix A: Definitions and sources
This appendix lists and defines the variables we use in the statistical analysis and gives
the sources.
• VOTE is a dummy variable coded one if an MP voted for the government’s deal
and zero if they voted against; coded separately for each of the three votes. This
coding takes into account that the Tellers, the Speaker and the deputy Speaker do
not cast a vote. Source: House of Commons Votes
• VOTE CHANGE 1-2 (VOTE CHANGE 2-3 ) is a dummy equal to 1 for MPs who
voted against in the first (second) Meaningful Vote and for in the second (third)
(zero otherwise). Source: House of Commons Votes
• REMAIN MP is a dummy variable coded one if the MP voted and campaigned to
remain in the referendum and zero otherwise. Source: SkyNews Analysis
• FRONTBENCH is a dummy variable coded one if the MP holds a governmental
position and zero otherwise. Source: House of Commons Library
• JUNIOR MP is a dummy variable coded one if the MP first entered Parliament
either in 2015 or 2017 and zero otherwise. Source: House of Commons Library
• LEAVE VOTE SHARE records the share of voters in each constituency who voted
to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum. Source: House of Commons Library
• FOREIGN records the share of people residing within a constituency that have not
been born within the UK. Source: Office for National Statistics
• POPULATION records the number of people residing within a constituency. Source:
House of Commons Library Local Data
• UNEMPLOYED records the unemployment rate within a constituency. Source:
House of Commons Library Local Data
• PUBLIC records the share of people residing within a constituency employed in
the public sector.Source: Office for National Statistics
• EDUCATED records the share of people residing within a constituency that have
a degree of higher education. Source: Office for National Statistics
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• WORKING AGE records the share of people residing within a constituency that
are between 16 and 64 years years old. Source: House of Commons Library Local
Data
• AGE records the representative’s age in years. Source: House of Commons Library
• FEMALE is a dummy variable coded one if the MP is female. Source: House of
Commons Library
• REBELLION is an index variable which proxies for the number of times a repre-
sentative has voted against the majority vote of the representative’s party. Source:
The Public Whip
• WIN MARGIN records, for each constituency, the difference between the vote share
of the winning candidate and the vote share of the runner up. Source: House of
Commons Library
• JOHNSON GOVERNMENT SENIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed to
a senior (Cabinet) position in the Johnson administration (zero otherwise). Source:
BBC News
• JOHNSON GOVERNMENT JUNIOR is equal to one if the MP was appointed to
a junior (non-cabinet) governmental position in the Johnson administration (zero
otherwise). Source: BBC News
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Appendix B: Additional data and estimation results
Table A1: Summary Statistics for sample of all Conservative MPs
Variable (1)N
(2)
Mean
(3)
Std. Dev.
(4)
Min.
(5)
Max.
VOTE (Binary) 941 0.752 0.432 0 1
Main Determinants
FRONTBENCH (Binary) 317 0.300 0.459 0 1
REMAIN MP (Binary) 317 0.546 0.499 0 1
JUNIOR MP (Binary) 317 0.309 0.463 0 1
LEAVE VOTE SHARE(%) 317 55.0 8.72 25.7 74.9
Constituency Controls
FOREIGN (%) 317 8.86 6.94 2.30 52.0
POPULATION (No.) 317 100,943 11,608 58,941 140,984
UNEMPLOYED (%) 317 2.00 1.06 0.547 6.55
PUBLIC (%) 317 17.8 6.56 5.60 47.1
EDUCATED (%) 317 27.6 7.14 12.3 55.2
WORKING AGE (%) 317 60.5 2.80 51.2 73.1
MP Controls
AGE (Yrs.) 317 51.6 9.85 27.0 78.0
FEMALE (Binary) 317 0.211 0.409 0 1
REBELLION (Index) 317 0.638 1.60 0 21.8
WIN MARGIN (pp) 317 23.2 13.0 0.066 49.7
Note: Appendix A lists definitions of the variables and provides details regarding the sources. The
sample is used to estimate the specification in Table 3, column (4).
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Table A2: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in the three Mean-
ingful Votes combined, Linear Probability Model
A. All Conservatives B. Conservative Backbenchers
FRONTBENCH 0.302*** 0.312*** 0.327*** - - -
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
REMAIN MP 0.265*** 0.257*** 0.266*** 0.348*** 0.333*** 0.346***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.112*** 0.086** 0.127*** 0.135*** 0.100** 0.155**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048) (0.062)
[0.003] [0.024] [0.006] [0.000] [0.038] [0.013]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.0001 -0.081** -0.079** -0.006 -0.103** -0.099**
(0.017) (0.034) (0.035) (0.023) (0.045) (0.045)
[0.994] [0.017] [0.027] [0.810] [0.017] [0.030]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 941 941 941 662 662 662
R2 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.29
Note: The table reports the results from a linear probability model estimated with Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) on the sample of all Conservative MPs (panel A) and for the sample of backbench MPs
(panel B). The dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in
support of the Withdrawal Agreement and zero when the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum;
JUNIOR MP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either
in 2015 or 2017; LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the
referendum in 2016 in each constituency; and FRONTBENCH is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP
holds a position in government. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include
population size, the unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share
of constituents with a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age.
MP controls include gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin
in the last election. Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values
are given in [square brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table A3: The probability of voting for the Withdrawal Agreement in the three Mean-
ingful Votes combined (Probit coefficients)
Backbencher sample Full Sample
Outcome: VOTE (1)Probit
(2)
Probit
(3)
Probit
(4)
OLS
FRONTBENCH - - - 0.327***
(0.035)
[0.000]
REMAIN MP 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.24*** 0.266***
(0.170) (0.174) (0.170) (0.034)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JUNIOR MP 0.504*** 0.380** 0.631*** 0.127***
(0.162) (0.176) (0.225) (0.046)
[0.002] [0.031] [0.000] [0.006]
LEAVE VOTE SHARE -0.007 -0.451** -0.498** -0.079**
(0.083) (0.0181) (0.196) (0.035)
[0.929] [0.013] [0.011] [0.027]
Vote Dummies YES YES YES YES
Const. Controls NO YES YES YES
MP Controls NO NO YES YES
N 662 662 662 941
(Pseudo-)R2 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.33
Note: Columns (1)-(3) report Probit estimates (rather than marginal effects) for the sample of Conser-
vative backbenchers and column (4) reports OLS estimates for the sample of all Conservative MPs. The
dependent variable (VOTE) is a binary variable equal to 1 whenever an MP voted in support of the
Withdrawal Agreement and zero when the MP rebelled by voting against. REMAIN MP is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the MP voted for remaining within the EU in the 2016 referendum; JUNIOR MP
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP was elected to the House of Commons either in 2015 or 2017;
LEAVE VOTE SHARE is the standardized share of voters who voted Leave in the referendum in 2016
in each constituency; and FRONTBENCH is a binary variable equal to 1 if the MP holds a position in
government. All specifications include vote dummies. Constituency controls include population size, the
unemployment rate, the share of constituents working in the public sector, the share of constituents with
a higher education degree, and the share of constituents who are of working age. MP controls include
gender, age, an index of the MP’s history of rebellion, and the MP’s win margin in the last election.
Standard errors (in round brackets) are clustered at the constituency level; p-values are given in [square
brackets]; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table A4: Breakdown of Meaningful Votes by Party and Government Positions (Alter-
native Affiliation Definition)
First Vote Second Vote Third Vote
For Against Abstain For Against Abstain For Against Abstain
Panel A - Vote by Party
Conservative 196 118 3 235 75 4 277 34 3
Labour 3 248 5 3 238 5 5 234 7
LD 0 11 0 0 11 0 0 11 0
SNP 0 35 0 0 35 0 0 34 1
DUP 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0
Other 3 10 8 4 22 8 4 21 9
Total 202 432 16 242 391 17 286 344 20
Panel B - Conservatives by Govt. Position
Frontbench 93 0 2 93 0 2 93 0 2
Backbench 103 118 1 142 75 2 184 34 1
Total 196 118 3 235 75 4 277 34 3
Note: This table shows the distribution of votes across the three Meaningful Votes taking into account
that three Conservative MPs and seven Labour MPs resigned and became independent between the first
and the second Meaningful Vote.
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